MOSCOW FORENSICS DAY '26MFD '26

Slides / 2 of 9

Talk slides

Mobile devices with a dedicated cryptographic processor

Vyacheslav Chikin · ACE NPP, ACE Lab
Day 1 — Thursday, 3 September 2026 · Scheduled 10:45–11:15 · In the recording 00:16:51–00:42:33

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  1. Slide 1 — Mobile devices with a dedicated cryptographic processor
    Page 100:18:24

    Slide text

    ≤·ACELab® l

    Mobile Devices with a Dedicated

    Cryptographic Processor

    2026

  2. Slide 2 — Mobile devices with a dedicated cryptographic processor
    Page 200:18:55

    Slide text

    Introduction

    We examine two platforms where CryptoMCU is a separate chip that communicates with the main CPU over an external bus.

    • MTK and Unisoc

    We will look at Samsung implementations for these devices

    • Kirin / Exynos

    An even more complex challenge

    Goal: understand when password processing can be moved off the phone, and when CryptoMCU makes this fundamentally impossible.

    CryptoMCU

    2026

  3. Slide 3 — Mobile devices with a dedicated cryptographic processor
    Page 300:19:33

    Slide text

    Devices and Interfaces

    Samsung Galaxy TAB

    A8

    SM-X205

    Samsung Galaxy A06

    SM-A065

    CPU

    Unisoc Tiger T618

    CPU

    MK Helio G85

    CryptoMCU

    S3FV9RRYDW-UK3A

    CryptoMCU

    S3K250AFDY-MF35

    Interface: SPI

    Interface: °C

    *YACELab®

    2026

  4. Slide 4 — Mobile devices with a dedicated cryptographic processor
    Page 400:20:03

    Slide text

    S3FV9RRYDW-UK3A (S3FV9RR)

    S3FV9RR Public Specifications

    MPU

    SYSTICKE

    UART

    SPI

    Clock Control

    Security Controter

    OMA

    1534KB/1024KB)

    Crypto RAM - SKB

    TORNADO-E

    Waschdog Timer Two 16 81

    Intorrupt

    AES/DES

    NoTore mood cry

    Category

    Applications

    Core

    Flash / RAM

    eSE

    Mobile, Lifestyle

    SC300 • 70 MHz

    2000 KB / 53K

    S3FV9RR eSE

    Crypto

    DES • 3DES • AES • RSA • ECC • Tornado-E

    Interfaces

    SPI slave • SWP • GPIO

    "ACELab®

    2026

  5. Slide 5 — Mobile devices with a dedicated cryptographic processor
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    S3K250AFDY-MF35 (S3K250AF)

    S3K250AF Public Specifications

    Type

    Secure IC

    Applications

    Mobile, Lifestyle

    Core

    SC000

    Memory

    Flash 252K • ROM 17K • RAM 11K

    Samsung Secure Element S3K250AF

    Crypto

    DES • 3DES • AES • RSA • ECC • TORNADO-T

    Interfaces

    ISO 7816 • PC

    "FACELab®

    2026

  6. Slide 6 — Mobile devices with a dedicated cryptographic processor
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    Galaxy TAB A8: Key Derivation

    A blob (knox_nonce) must be obtained from CryptoMCU. Once it is available, password verification can be moved off the device.

    knox nonce + rot + color + is_locked + secdis

    + some_const + hw_unique + user_pwa

    key_for_encrypted_key

    fs_space_key

    " ACELab®

    2026

  7. Slide 7 — Mobile devices with a dedicated cryptographic processor
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    Galaxy TAB A8: Accessing CryptoMCU

    1 Power / wake

    CryptoMCU is powered on

    for the transaction

    Handshake

    2

    Initialize session and credentials

    Challenge

    3

    Verify credentials

    Open Secure Channel

    Negotiate a secure channel

    Encrypted exchange

    Commands and data

    are encrypted

    SPI-monitoring does not reveal knox_nonce: the challenge and encrypted exchange prevent it.

    *ACELab®

    2026

  8. Slide 8 — Mobile devices with a dedicated cryptographic processor
    Page 800:24:42

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    Why Passive SPI Monitoring Is Not Enough

    Even a physical connection to the bus does not provide knox_nonce.

    SPI

    monitor

    Challenge

    prevents

    replay

    Secure channel hides useful

    data

    knox_nonce cannot be extracted passively

    You must participate in the transaction as a legitimate party, or control it through the device CPU, rather than merely observe it.

    *ACELab®

    2026

  9. Slide 9 — Mobile devices with a dedicated cryptographic processor
    Page 900:25:12

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    Obtaining knox_nonce: Passive Approaches

    1. Monitor SPI

    2. Obtain the Challenge Key

    Not feasible: the challenge and encrypted exchange prevent extraction of a usable knox_nonce from passive traffic.

    Removing and reading the chip looks more promising, but the key is bound to the CPU.

    Conclusion: move from observation to control of the device CPU.

    *ACELab®

    2026

  10. Slide 10 — Mobile devices with a dedicated cryptographic processor
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    Obtaining knox_nonce: The Active Approach

    Take control of the CPU

    Control SPI

    through the CPU

    Power on

    CryptoMCU

    Transaction with CryptoMCU

    Key difficulty: CryptoMCU is powered only during transactions, through a separate protection system.

    Feasible, but complex

    *FACELab®

    2026

  11. Slide 11 — Mobile devices with a dedicated cryptographic processor
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    TAB A8: Interim Conclusion

    High Complexity

    Off-Device Processing

    Is Possible

    The challenge, secure channel, CPU-bound key and CryptoMCU power control create a hardware barrier.

    Once knox_nonce is obtained, user_pwd is used in an algorithm that can run outside the phone.

    Despite the complexity, this design allows user password

    brute-forcing to be moved off the device.

    LACELab®

    2026

  12. Slide 12 — Mobile devices with a dedicated cryptographic processor
    Page 1200:27:18

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    Moving to Galaxy A6 / SM-A065

    1

    Take control of the CPU

    2

    Control

    the I'C bus

    3

    Power on

    CryptoMCU

    4

    fs_space_key?

    How is it derived?

    Key point: Weaver moves control of user authentication into CryptoMCU.

    *YACELab®

    2026

  13. Slide 13 — Mobile devices with a dedicated cryptographic processor
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    Why Success Is Not Guaranteed

    If Only a Secret Blob Is Needed

    If Verification Is Inside CryptoMCU

    Obtain the blob

    Verify user_pwd

    off-device

    user_pwd is verified through

    CryptoMCU

    TAB A8 Logic

    Weaver Logic

    2YACELab®

    2026

  14. Slide 14 — Mobile devices with a dedicated cryptographic processor
    Page 1400:28:21

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    Weaver Changes the Security Model

    CryptoMCU participates in verification and controls attempts.

    rot + color + is_locked + secdis + some_const

    + hw_unique + user_pwd + weawer_info

    hash

    CryptoMCU

    key_for_encrypted_key

    Password verified inside CryptoMCU

    Attempt counter controlled by MCU

    Failures may be recorded

    fs_space_key

    "ACELab®

    2026

  15. Slide 15 — Mobile devices with a dedicated cryptographic processor
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    What Weaver Changes

    1

    Authentication

    Control in CryptoMCU

    2

    Attempt Counter

    3

    Failure Tracking

    Verifying user_pwd is not simply an algorithm that can run indefinitely outside the device.

    CryptoMCU can limit the number of attempts and thereby affect the brute-force rate.

    Failed attempts may be recorded inside the device, and the device may stop responding.

    2·ACELab®

    2026

  16. Slide 16 — Mobile devices with a dedicated cryptographic processor
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    When Off-Device Brute-Forcing Is Possible

    Where Is user_pwd

    Verified?

    TOS/OS

    Example: TAB A8

    CryptoMCU

    Example: SM-A065

    Off-device brute-forcing is possible

    Off-device brute-forcing is not possible

    "ACELab®

    2026

  17. Slide 17 — Mobile devices with a dedicated cryptographic processor
    Page 1700:31:56

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    Thank You

    for Your Attention!

    ACELab®

    2026