MOSCOW FORENSICS DAY '26MFD '26

Slides / 9 of 9

Talk slides

Examining electronic storage media when information security tools are unavailable

Yuri Pavensky · independent expert
Day 2 — Friday, 4 September 2026 · Scheduled 13:10–13:40 · In the recording 04:09:13–04:46:57 (the recording breaks off mid-sentence)

An English deck and the text under the slides

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  1. Slide 1 — Examining electronic storage media when information security tools are unavailable
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    MOSCOW FORENSICS DAY 2026 / 04.09.2026

    Forensic Examination

    of Digital Storage Media

    When Security Tools Are Unavailable

    Yuri Alekseevich Pavensky Independent Expert

    MFD 2026 / DIGITAL FORENSICS

    01

  2. Slide 2 — Examining electronic storage media when information security tools are unavailable
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    INITIAL SITUATION

    Security tools are deployed, but normal access is restricted

    SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

    DATA NETWORK

    ACCESS TO SECURITY TOOLS

    DIGITAL EVIDENCE

    Security tools deployed

    No connectivity

    Restricted

    Remains on local

    systems

    SIEM, EDR, DLP, WAF, NGFW,

    The corporate network is not

    SOAR and other solutions

    functioning properly

    Penetration tests and practical exercises

    Normal access through the

    And continues to change every

    corporate network is

    second

    unavailable. Access to individual security tools may still be possible

    Improving incident response

    orocesses

    Regular audits

    Having security tools does not guarantee that their data will be accessible during an incident

    MFD 2026 / DIGITAL FORENSICS

    02

  3. Slide 3 — Examining electronic storage media when information security tools are unavailable
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    INITIAL POINT OF COMPROMISE

    A leaked password exposed personal accounts

    01 / SOURCE

    02 / USER

    03 / PASSWORD

    04 / ACCESS

    Employee of an IdM

    Online store database

    software developer

    Password reuse

    Personal accounts compromised

    Customer personal data became

    A personal email address was

    publicly available, including

    used to register with the online

    email addresses and passwords

    store

    for customer accounts

    The same password was used for several of the employee's

    personal accounts

    Personal mailbox

    Public cloud storage

    At this stage, only the employee's personal accounts and resources had been compromised

    MFD 2026 / DIGITAL FORENSICS

    03

  4. Slide 4 — Examining electronic storage media when information security tools are unavailable
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    INFORMATION GATHERING AND ATTACK PREPARATION

    Email correspondence revealed information about customers

    01 / OSINT

    02 / PERSONAL RESOURCES

    03 / CUSTOMERS

    04 / ACTIVE DIRECTORY

    Employee profile

    Personal mailbox and

    Organizations and IT

    cloud storage

    infrastructure

    Accounts

    Additional personal mailboxes

    Corporate email address

    Work correspondence was discovered

    List of organizations

    Jump hosts

    Service accounts

    Privileged accounts

    Contact details

    Remote access methods

    Organization and job title

    The information obtained enabled the attackers to prepare an attack on one of the customers

    MFD 2026 / DIGITAL FORENSICS

    04

  5. Slide 5 — Examining electronic storage media when information security tools are unavailable
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    ATTACK VIA A CONTRACTOR

    Impersonating a contractor enabled access to a jump host

    01

    CORRESPONDENCE The conversation with a customer continued through the contractor employee's personal

    email account

    02

    PRETEXT

    Additional work was presented as a continuation of legitimate cooperation

    03

    ACCESS

    Remote access to the customer's jump host was obtained

    04

    RECONNAISSANCE

    The attackers studied remote access methods, the domain environment, accounts and privileges, critical servers, databases and network architecture

    Access to the jump host was used for reconnaissance over the following week

    MFD 2026 / DIGITAL FORENSICS

    05

  6. Slide 6 — Examining electronic storage media when information security tools are unavailable
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    ACTIVE DIRECTORY COMPROMISE

    Compromising AD established a persistent presence

    AD

    01

    ACCOUNTS

    Active Directory accounts were compromised

    DOMAIN ENVIRONMENT

    The pivot point from the jump host into the IT infrastructure

    -02

    PRIVILEGES

    Credentials were obtained for privileged and service

    accounts

    • 03

    PERSISTENCE

    A persistent presence was established in the IT infrastructure

    After AD was compromised, the attack extended beyond a single jump host

    MFD 2026 / DIGITAL FORENSICS

    06

  7. Slide 7 — Examining electronic storage media when information security tools are unavailable
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    SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS

    Databases and a backup of an IT employee's personal mobile device were exfiltrated

    01 / DISCOVERY AND EXFILTRATION

    02 / DISCOVERY AND EXFILTRATION

    DATABASES

    UNENCRYPTED MOBILE DEVICE BACKUP

    A personal Apple mobile device The backup was found on an IT employee's corporate workstation

    CONTAINED INFORMATION ABOUT

    BACKUP CONTENTS

    Finances

    Employees Customers Logistics processes

    Conversations in messaging apps Various credentials Communication network diagrams Photos of documents containing confidential information

    The unencrypted personal mobile device backup became another source of confidential information

    MFD 2026 / DIGITAL FORENSICS

    07

  8. Slide 8 — Examining electronic storage media when information security tools are unavailable
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    DESTRUCTIVE ACTIONS AND LOSS OF NORMAL VISIBILITY

    Server backups were destroyed and corporate network connectivity was disrupted

    01

    IT SERVER BACKUPS DESTROYED

    02

    NETWORK DEVICE CONFIGURATION FILES DELETED

    03

    CORE SWITCH CONFIGURATIONS MODIFIED

    RESULT

    CORPORATE DATA NETWORK CONNECTIVITY DISRUPTED

    01 DOMAIN ENVIRONMENT DEGRADED 02 NORMAL ACCESS TO MOST SECURITY TOOLS LOST 03 CENTRALIZED ACCESS TO TELEMETRY RESTRICTED

    MFD 2026 / DIGITAL FORENSICS

    08

  9. Slide 9 — Examining electronic storage media when information security tools are unavailable
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    DENIAL OF DATA ACCESS AND EXTORTION

    Database encryption escalated into extortion

    01

    PASSWORDS

    Passwords for corporate databases were changed

    02

    ENCRYPTION

    Databases in the organization's IT infrastructure were encrypted

    03

    RANSOM

    An IT employee received a ransom demand via Telegram in exchange for restoring

    access to the data

    04

    The attackers threatened to publish all information from the personal Apple device

    DATA PUBLICATION

    backup that could damage the employee's honor, dignity and professional reputation. To demonstrate that the threat was real, they posted some of this information in a Telegram channel

    The extortion combined denial of data access with threats to publish sensitive information

    MFD 2026 / DIGITAL FORENSICS

    09

  10. Slide 10 — Examining electronic storage media when information security tools are unavailable
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    KEY FEATURES OF THE CASE

    Three risk factors and the role of digital forensics

    01 / PERSONAL ACCOUNT

    02 / CONTRACTOR

    03 / DATA STORAGE

    START OF THE CHAIN

    TRUSTED ACCESS

    DATA OUTSIDE

    CONTROL

    Compromising a single personal

    Trusted access for contractors

    account can lead to a

    without adequate oversight

    large-scale incident

    creates significant risk

    Unauthorized storage of restricted work information on personal mobile devices and in their backups can harm both the organization and the employee

    When normal access to security tools is unavailable, digital forensics helps reconstruct the incident

    MFD 2026 / DIGITAL FORENSICS

    10

  11. Slide 11 — Examining electronic storage media when information security tools are unavailable
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    OVERALL RESPONSE WORKFLOW

    10 response stages when normal access to security tools is unavailable

    01-05 / INITIAL ACTIONS AND DECISIONS

    06-10 / COLLECTION, RECONSTRUCTION AND CLOSURE

    01 Document, register and perform initial escalation

    06 Preserve volatile artifacts and data at high risk of loss

    02 Organize the response

    03 Make a preliminary assessment of incident scope

    07 Acquire verifiable copies of storage devices, virtual machines and persistent digital data for subsequent examination

    04 Issue mandatory notifications and coordinate externally

    08 Reconstruct the attack sequence and test hypotheses

    05 Decide on further actions for the systems and devices under investigation

    09 Remediate the impact and restore the IT infrastructure

    10 Close the security incident and implement corrective actions

    MFD 2026 / DIGITAL FORENSICS

    11

  12. Slide 12 — Examining electronic storage media when information security tools are unavailable
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    DECIDING WHAT TO DO WITH EACH HOST

    Preserve volatile artifacts or isolate the host?

    01 / PRESERVE VOLATILE ARTIFACTS BEFORE ISOLATION

    02 / PRIORITIZE CONTAINMENT

    Conditions: • A link to the incident has been established; • damage is no longer occurring; • there are no suspicious network connections or attacker-accessible paths to other systems and resources.

    Conditions: • Encryption, deletion or modification of data continues; • a suspicious network connection exists; • an attacker-accessible path to other systems and resources remains.

    KEEP THE HOST POWERED ON UNTIL STAGE 6 IS COMPLETE

    CONTAINMENT TAKES PRIORITY

    Take further actions in accordance with the documented decision.

    Perform automated data collection if acceptable. Then isolate the host, preferably without powering it off. If any delay is unacceptable, isolate it immediately and preserve the available data afterward.

    SPECIAL CASES (FULL PROCEDURE AVAILABLE VIA THE QR CODE):

    • No established link to the incident: do not collect data (reconsider if new information becomes available). • Host powered off: do not power it on or boot its operating system. • Running VM: take a snapshot including RAM, if supported and if this does not delay containment.

    There is no universal rule to "collect everything first" or "isolate everything immediately." Make a separate decision for each host.

    MFD 2026 / DIGITAL FORENSICS

    12

  13. Slide 13 — Examining electronic storage media when information security tools are unavailable
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    PRESERVATION ORDER FOR VOLATILE ARTIFACTS AND DATA AT HIGH RISK OF LOSS

    Start with the data most likely to be lost

    01

    BASIC HOST INFORMATION

    Host name, operating system or loaded kernel version, uptime, current account, system date, time and time zone; simultaneously record the time from an independent source and its offset from the host's system time

    02

    SESSIONS AND ACTIVITY

    Active users and sessions, processes and services with their startup parameters, cached authentication data for current sessions, and open files

    03

    LOGS AND MODULES

    Local logs at risk of being overwritten, loaded drivers and modules, kernel extensions, and active interprocess communication mechanisms

    04

    NETWORK STATE

    Network interfaces, active connections and listening ports, network routes, and information about neighboring hosts (ARP/NDP)

    Capture a RAM dump after collecting the data listed above*

    * If a compatible, tested tool is available and the operation does not create unacceptable risk.

    MFD 2026 / DIGITAL FORENSICS

    13

  14. Slide 14 — Examining electronic storage media when information security tools are unavailable
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    CAPTURING THE CURRENT STATE OF SWITCHES AND ROUTERS

    Capture the state before restoring the network

    CLI

    01

    BEFORE THE FIRST

    Enable terminal session logging and record the time from

    an independent source

    COMMAND

    LOCAL ACCESS

    • 02

    Connect through the local console port from a standalone workstation that is not joined to the domain

    FIRST COMMAND

    Capture the available command history: new commands

    may displace earlier entries from the limited buffer

    • 03

    THEN CAPTURE THE STATE

    Record system time, device version and uptime, administrative sessions, logs, running and startup configurations, interface status, network routes and key operational tables

    Use only pre-tested display commands with minimal and predictable impact

    MFD 2026 / DIGITAL FORENSICS

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  15. Slide 15 — Examining electronic storage media when information security tools are unavailable
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    ACQUIRING VERIFIABLE COPIES OF DIGITAL DATA

    A verifiable copy: provenance and integrity

    VERIFIABILITY - data source, acquisition method, tool and version, operation time, output location and calculated checksums.

    01 / PHYSICAL DRIVE

    02 / RAID ARRAY

    03 / VIRTUAL MACHINE

    WRITE PROTECTION

    NO UNNECESSARY DISASSEMBLY

    SELF-CONTAINED SET

    Do not boot the operating system from the

    drive under examination.

    A hardware write blocker is preferred.

    If none is available, use pre-tested software write protection.

    Acquire a sector-by-sector (bit-for-bit) copy when technically feasible and justified.

    Record the controller model, RAID level and state, disk count, physical bay (slot) numbers, serial numbers and the state of each disk.

    If the logical volume is accessible through the existing controller, acquire it without disassembling the array; prevent writes

    and automatic rebuilds.

    Otherwise, reconstruct it from copies of the physical drives.

    Export the configuration, platform logs, base virtual disk and the full chain of linked differencing disks.

    Export the memory state file if available.

    If a sector-by-sector (bit-for-bit) copy is technically impossible, perform documented, targeted collection

    MFD 2026 / DIGITAL FORENSICS

    15